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Abstract. The concept of  self  has preeminently been asserted 
(in its many versions) as a core  component of  anti-reductionist, anti-
naturalistic philosophical positions, from Descartes to Husserl and 
beyond, with the exception of  some hybrid or intermediate positions 
which declare rather glibly that, since we are biological entities which 
fully belong to the natural world, and we are conscious of  ourselves 
as 'selves', therefore the self  belongs to the natural world (this is 
characteristic e.g. of  embodied phenomenology and enactivism). 
Nevertheless, from Cudworth and More’s attacks on materialism all 
the way through twentieth-century argument against naturalism, the 
gulf  between selfhood and the world of  Nature appears 
unbridgeable. In contrast, my goal in this paper is to show that early 
modern materialism could yield a theory of  the self  according to 
which (1) the self  belongs to the world of  external relations 
(Spinoza), such that no one fact, including supposedly private facts, is 
only accessible to a single person; (2) the self  can be reconstructed as 
a sense of  “organic unity” which could be a condition for biological 
individuality (a central text here is Diderot’s 1769 Rêve de D’Alembert); 
yet this should not lead us to espouse a Romantic concept of  
organism as foundational or even ineffable subjectivity (a dimension 
present in Leibniz and made explicit in German idealism); (3) what 
we call 'self' might simply be a dynamic process of  interpretive 
activity undertaken by the brain. This materialist theory of  the self  
should not neglect the nature of  experience, but it should also not 
have to take at face value the recurring invocations of  a better, deeper 
“first-person perspective” or “first-person science.” 
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 La moitié d’un moi est une absurdité contradictoire, et une portion de 
matière qu’on ne peut partager est aussi une contradiction : comment donc se 
persuader que l’esprit et la matière ne sont pas deux substances différentes? 
(Suzanne Necker, 1798) 
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1. Introduction 
Our familiarity with the diverse forms of  early modern materialism has grown 
a great deal in recent decades, marking a considerable advance over older (if  still 
regrettably common at times) views of  materialism as inherently mechanistic, fixated 
on the idea of  the body as machine, or denying basic features of  embodiment.1 
Similarly, some progress has been made with regard to the two rather monolithic 
conceptions of  materialism as either a kind of  cosmological posit concerning the 
material nature of  the universe as a whole (often coming hand in glove with a matter 
theory) or as a variant of  what philosophers in the twentieth century came to call the 
‘identity theory’ of  brain and mind, namely a more localized claim concerning the 
identity of  cerebral processes and mental processes, as in the definition of  materialists 
given in the Encyclopédie article “Matérialistes”: “those who argue that that the human 
soul is composed of  matter.”2 Even such a well-known piece of  argumentation (with 
endless polemical and over-interpreted reverberations)3 as Locke’s reflections on the 
possibility of  thinking matter, or to be precise, the possibility that God could have 
“superadded” thought to matter,4 ended up creating conceptual spaces located very 
much in between these two classic positions.  
Locke himself  had noted that if  we can conceive of  God superadding 
different properties to matter, to make, e.g., plants, “with all the excellencies of  
vegetation, life, and beauty, which are to be found in a rose or a peach tree, etc., above 
the essence of  matter in general,” or “other properties that are to be found in an 
elephant,” nothing prevents us from conceiving that God could add the property of  
thought5; and he alludes to the possibility implicit therein, that human and animal 
minds would then be less different, less separate than is often held, and thereby that 
‘materiality’ and ‘mindedness’ are not radically separate. The latter consequence was 
spelled out by the celebrated free-thinker and pornographer, the Marquis d’Argens, in 
his La philosophie du bon sens (1737), claiming again on the basis of  superaddition that 
one could not deny God’s ability to elevate the faculties of  an animal soul to that of  a 
human one,6 and also turning the point around: “if  animals thus possess a material 
Soul, Feeling is then not incompatible with Matter: the latter allows of  it” (383). And 
in the revolutionary-era Encyclopédie méthodique, the entry on “Materialists (Atheists)”, 
which is partly drawn from Cudworth – illustrating the well-known principle that 
apologeticists are the best theorists and typologists of  materialism – distinguishes 
between the cosmological thesis and the brain-mind (or body-soul) identity thesis, but 
then observes that they are often collapsed: “materialists argue either that man’s soul is 
matter, or that matter is eternal and is God; or that God is just a universal soul 
distributed throughout matter which moves and arranges it, either to produce beings 
or to create the various arrangements we see throughout the universe.”7  
So in addition to the two basic claims concerning either the materiality of  the 
world or a type of  mind-brain identity (or body-soul identity, including in Epicurean and 
naturalized Aristotelian-Averroist conceptions of  the material soul),8 there exist 
various intermediate positions – combinations, hybridizations and at times pastiches 
of  more familiar views. Nevertheless, the nature of  the relation between these two 
types of  materialist claims remains an open question: does the position that the 
universe is entirely material, commit one to a specific brain:mind identity claim? 
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Certainly the reverse does not hold. Indeed, some cerebral materialists such as La 
Mettrie consider that our ever-revised knowledge of  neuroanatomy and 
neurophysiology, as it impacts (‘falsifies’) our knowledge of  the mind, has really 
nothing to do with traditional metaphysical claims about the nature of  reality: we will 
never know the essence of  matter, which does not mean we should not be 
materialists.9 Conversely, the realization that the materialist philosopher should be 
specifically concerned with the status of  the brain is a relatively late occurrence, 
explicit in Toland and Collins in the early years of  the eighteenth century (in 1704, 
Toland writes, “Whatever be the Principle of  Thinking in Animals, yet it cannot be 
perform’d but by the means of  the Brain,” and four years later, Collins asserts to 
Samuel Clarke that consciousness “is a real Quality, truly and properly inhering in the 
Subject itself, the Brain, as Modes of  Motion do in some Bodies, and Roundness does 
in others”)10 but only really reaching prominence (and analytic depth) in authors such 
as La Mettrie and Diderot. 
The different ways in which materialist authors could treat the relation 
between the materiality of  the world and the materiality of  the mind (via the latter’s 
corporeality or cerebrality) are deserving of  further examination, including in contrast 
to what we have come to think of  as early modern panpsychism, e.g. in Margaret 
Cavendish. But in what follows I examine another aspect of  the second species of  
materialist claim (about the mental), or rather, an obstacle, a stumbling-block to what 
might otherwise seem like a successful process of  conceptual steam-rolling (i.e., 
immanentization). I have in mind the materialist treatment of  the self, and overall the 
cluster of  problems concerning selfhood, individuality and personal identity, in 
various authors but most centrally in Diderot. (My analysis is neither a standard 
internalist reconstruction of  a problem in Diderot, with passing mention of  other 
period authors, nor an intellectual history-type survey of  a problem in the period, with 
discussion of  as many authors as possible. It is, as the title indicates, a reflection on 
Diderot and materialist theories of  the self. That is, the aim is to reconstruct a 
problem, and it turns out, at least according to my analysis, that Diderot puts forth 
one of  the more significant and original versions of  a materialist theory of  the self  – 
but one which, of  course, appropriates elements from other authors.)11 The self  was 
often seen as simply a part of  the classic ‘matter and mind’ problem. Thus Suzanne 
Necker reprises classic Cartesian points but to speak of  the self: “half  of  a self is a 
contradictory absurdity, while a portion of  matter that cannot be divided is also a 
contradiction: how can mind and matter not be different substances ?”12 One should 
note that this shift to the problem of  the self  presents a particular kind of  conceptual 
challenge. Why should the materialist approach to the self  be particularly challenging? 
Because the latter belongs to a time-honored family of  philosophical intuitions which 
are perennially presented as light-years removed from the world of  materialism. From 
Augustine (Confessions, X, 16, 25)  to Descartes and onto to Paul Ricoeur, or from 
Kant and Schelling onto Husserl and Heidegger (but also, Wittgenstein, Anscombe, 
Chisholm, Nagel, etc.), we are told in endlessly varied ways that the self  is not, to 
borrow Wallace Stevens’ elegant line, “composed of  the external world”:13 that the 
self  is not of  the material world, whether this has to do with its lack of  divisibility, its 
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temporal essence, the inner sense,14 grammatical properties of  the first person, or 
other ‘facts’. 
Contrasting with such views (or intuitions, which is often what they are), I 
point to the existence of  an early modern materialist discussion of  self  – an 
intellectual ‘tradition’, even if  it lacks direct transmission or continuity, given that 
materialism is, in Günther Mensching’s phrase, a “discontinuous tradition,” which 
does not evolve according to a direct transmission or connection between doctrines, 
from one generation to the next.15 I say ‘early modern’ – broadly construed as 
extending from Spinoza and Locke to Diderot – because I do not believe that the 
attempt to combine thoroughgoing materialism and a concept of  self  is somehow a 
‘timeless’ feature of  materialist thought (indeed, it is possible although I make no such 
metahistorical claims on my own account, that concern with the self  is a post-
Cartesian development, in the sense of  the Augustinian elements in Descartes – or 
even Luther on some readings).16 This materialist approach to the self  can take (at 
least) three forms, which occur independently of  one another (e.g. in Spinoza, Dom 
Deschamps or La Mettrie) but which can also be combined, as they are in admittedly 
programmatic form in Diderot. These are: externalism as a metaphysical position, (§ 
2), the biologization of  individuality, that is, a justification of  individuality in biological 
terms (§ 3), and the equation of  brain and self, in a reductionist approach to the 
problem of  personal identity (§ 4). In conclusion (§ 5) I suggest that rather than being 
‘blind to the world of  internal life’ as was often claimed of  materialism, there can be 
something like a materialist theory of  self, notably but not exclusively as sketched in 
Diderot. Differently put, rather than a whole-scale elimination of  the mental, the early 
modern materialist approach could also be a ‘naturalization’ of  the mental – an 
inscription of  mental life in the broader natural world, which does not make it 
disappear as if  by waving a wand.17 
Here, paying attention to historical context can help rid us of  some 
philosophical commonplaces, such as the phenomenological opposition between the 
realm of  Nature and the realm of  the mind, itself  an iteration of  Cartesian dualism, 
despite its protestations. Quite typical is Husserl’s opposition of  the world of  the 
mental to causality: “As far as causality is concerned, we have to say that if  we call 
causality that functional or lawful relation of  dependence which is the correlate of  the 
constitution of  persistent properties of  a persistent real something of  the type 
Nature, then as regards the soul we cannot speak of  causality at all.”18 To be fair, the 
opposition between what it is to be part of  Nature and what it is to be a ‘self ’ does 
not have to take the classic form of  substance dualism: the ‘I’ can be redefined as a 
function.19 In addition, many of  the rejections of  mainstream conceptions of  the self  
are not materialist in character, most notably, Hume’s looking inward and not finding 
an object called ‘self ’.20 Nevertheless, I suggest that a reconstruction of  some 
materialist positions on the self  (including their appropriation and transformation of  
elements from such sources as Spinoza and Locke) may yield some insights and some 
‘displacements’ of  our historico-philosophical commonplaces. 
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2. Externalism 
Externalism is to be understood here not as a semantic theory or a social 
theory of  mind (at least two of  the other senses of  the term) but rather as the 
position according to which mental states lack any inaccessible, ‘first-person’ 
dimension; any such dimension would be either explainable in external terms or 
traceable to processes in the agent which produce a ‘feeling’ of  interiority.21 If  the 
internalist holds that “States, or experiences […] owe their identity as particulars to 
the identity of  the person whose states or experiences they are,” as in Cudworth’s 
conception of  the self  as to hegemonikon or as defined by sui potestas, endlessly echoing 
itself,22 the ‘externalist’ holds that “no fact is only accessible to a single person,”23 and 
deplores, as Diderot does in § X of  his 1753 Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature, that it 
is easier to consult oneself  than to consult Nature. The externalist will hold that any 
sense of  unity, any foundational dimension of  selfhood, in fact comes from outside. 
Materialism implies externalism but externalism does not imply or entail materialism 
(a vision of  the mind as social, including as behaviourally constituted in a world of  
activity, is not committed to a materialist metaphysics). 
One can also see the distinction between internalism and externalism in the 
difference, familiar to scholars, between the Cartesian cogito and the Spinozist homo 
cogitat (Ethics IIa2). That ‘homo cogitat’ is not a foundational property of  a first 
person; the self, and its key property, thinking, is not foundational. To be a thinking 
subject is simply to belong to the universe of  causal relations, to be a particular 
intersection within it. In Spinoza’s memorable phrase, “The order and the connection 
of  ideas is the same as the order and the connection of  things.”24 For the externalist, 
no fact, datum or vécu belongs to a private, off-limits zone, for what is first is not the 
thinker but the web of  relations to which thought belongs. As Dewey put it in very 
Spinozist terms, challenging first-person foundationalism: “There is nothing in nature 
that belongs absolutely and exclusively to anything else; belonging is always a matter of  
reference and distributive assignment.”25 Of  course, Spinoza doesn’t content himself  
with this static vision of  a grid of  relations; he emphasizes that any such particular 
‘individuated’ entity strives to persevere in existence, as the finite mode it is. I cannot 
improve on Morfino’s summary: 
 
[F]or Spinoza the individual is neither substance nor subject [but…] is a 
relation between an outside and an inside constituted by this very relation 
(there is no absolute interiority of  the cogito opposed to the absolute 
exteriority of  a world). This relation constitutes the essence of  the individual, 
comprised of  its own existence-power. . . . It is a variable power, precisely 
because the constitutive relation between inner and outer is unstable, not 
established. The passions are not, therefore, the property of  an already given 
human nature, but they are relations constituting the human individual; their 
locus is not interiority, but the space between individuals.26 
 
One could say that the externalist has a relational definition of  what it is to be 
an individual, as a particular duration within a given, causally closed space-time; in the 
specifically biological version of  this position, this will become the particular duration 
 
 
 
Charles T. Wolfe - Diderot and Materialist Theories of  the Self 
80 
of  a state of  relations which constitutes a given individual – a tree, a beetle, a person – 
qua that which resists decomposition (a “conatus ad existendum”). Of  course, to claim 
that Spinoza defines the individual as a relation, or has an ontology in which there is a 
primacy of  relation, may seem to run counter to the obvious fact that Spinoza thinks 
the individual is defined by its own conatus, its own essence (E IIIp9s: the conatus is 
our essence). Yet the relational view has in favor of  it, equally core Spinozist 
definitions: our body needs a great number of  other bodies to survive (EIIp13, 4th 
postulate), just as our mind would be imperfect if  it only took itself  as an object 
(EIVp18s). In addition, bodies form a single body or individual when their 
movements are related to one another (or when they “communicate” according to a 
precise ratio or relation: EIIp13d). In sum, our essence is a certain ration, proportion 
or relation of  motion and rest (ratio motus et quietis).27 
For the externalist, an experience, a desire, or a belief  do not belong de jure to 
a constitutive subject, but rather de facto, to a subject which they constitute.28 Indeed, 
the subject is constituted by her progressive filtering (and filtering out) of  the world, 
which also serves as an argument against skepticism, according to the idea that the 
senses are made for x. This sensory filtering is described in Diderot’s important, but at 
the time unpublished Rêve de D’Alembert (1769) as constitutive of  our individuality: no 
one’s sensory make-up is identical to anyone else’s sensory make-up. “The animal is a 
unified whole,” both because of  its specific physiological constitution (organisation), 
and specifically because of  what he calls its organic continuity, as distinct from the mere 
contiguity of  parts.29 The limits of  our sensory system are also the limits of  our 
individual, in the sense that however much all of  matter may be living matter, I cannot 
sense what is happening on Saturn, for between me and this planet “there are only 
contiguous bodies, instead of  continuity.”30 In the Éléments de physiologie, he puts it this 
way: “if  external sensations . . . and inner sensations were equally intimate to me, 
everything would be me, and I would be everything.”31 I don’t perceive the cosmos 
directly (my perceptual apparatus acts as a filter); if  I did, the barriers of  my self  
would somehow be the barriers of  the world. For sensation (perception, experience) 
are both real and constitutive of  self, here. In an Epicurean vein, Diderot insists that 
“Il n’y a point de plaisir senti qui soit chimérique,” which is reminiscent of  a passage 
in Shaftesbury’s Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit (which Diderot translated), where our 
sensations are described as real regardless of  the status of  the objects: “For let us 
carry scepticism ever so far, let us doubt, if  we can, of  everything about us, we cannot 
doubt of  what passes within ourselves. Our passions and affections are known to us. 
They are certain, whatever the objects may be on which they are employed.”32 Again, 
Diderot is stating that “no experienced pleasure is illusory,” Shaftesbury, that “our 
passions and affections . . . are certain.” Both of  them are indebted to the Epicurean 
credo according to which, ‘if  you argue against all your sensations, you will then have 
no criterion to declare any of  them false’,33 which becomes stronger in the Lucretian 
version, as it takes the form of  infallibility: ‘there is no error in sense-perception’.34 
But Shaftesbury (perhaps) and Diderot (certainly) are adding an additional claim, not 
just a rebuttal of  skepticism but an assertion of  a kind of  a ‘sensory self ’. 
The self  is constituted from without, and the sensory part of  this process 
entails that no two subjects will perceive the same object in the same fashion. This is 
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the properly materialist way of  accepting that someone’s life-history, including the 
larger-scale evolutionary history, is constitutive of  their being. Notice that we have a 
criterion of  personal identity here: “For any organism x and any y, x = y if  and only if  
x’s life is y’s life.”35 And since externalism does not mean that my self  is equal to the 
universe as a whole, we can see something of  a biological emphasis being smuggled in 
here. If  I am not defined by a free, unconditioned inner space of  interiority, but by a 
multitude of  ‘petites perceptions’ (often interpreted in determinist and materialist 
terms in the early eighteenth century, e.g. by Anthony Collins in his Inquiry Concerning 
Human Liberty of  1717)36 crisscrossing in my mental life, by my physiological 
constitution, by ‘the blood which flows in my veins’, as La Mettrie would have it (each 
of  us, the criminal and the honest man, are in pursuit of  our own good – happiness, 
particularly understood as pleasure –; whether I am virtuous or vicious depends “on 
my blood”; it was because of  his blood that “Cartouche was made to be 
Cartouche”),37 then we have gradually shifted from externalism per se to a biologization 
of  individuality. 
 
3. The organic self 
There is nothing novel or particularly radical about philosophy turning to the 
biological world to obtain its ‘best definition’ of  what an individual substance is; think 
of  the notable case of  Aristotle, who tended to use actual organisms as paradigm 
cases of  individual substances, or in contemporary parlance, “paradigmatic 
individuals.”38 The same has been observed of  the biomedical sources of  Leibniz’s 
idea of  substance, and the monad.39 But it is a further step to say that the traits 
associated with our interiority are themselves biological in nature – whether it be the 
‘inner sense’, intentionality, the synthetic unity of  apperception, consciousness, and so 
on. Indeed, one author warned in the later nineteenth century against committing a 
sort of  category mistake and confusing the self  with the ‘feeling of  organic unity’.40 I 
am interested in the narrower class of  thinkers who explicitly disobey the Nietzschean 
warning not to confuse the self  with the feeling of  organic unity, or in more general 
terms, who think that facts about selves, including experiential ones, might turn out to be 
biological facts. Of  course, even in this narrower class we can find the argument running 
in two contrasting directions: either  
 
— a reductionist direction, in which the thinker will retain whichever 
experiential, existential or phenomenal properties can be successfully 
preserved after a reduction to the biological facts41  
 
or 
 
— a holist direction, in which there is a ‘transfer’ of  subjective properties onto 
biological entities, usually the ‘organism’ (which is one major reason for the 
bad reputation of  the concept of  organism in some circles, and its constant 
exorcization). 
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I shall take Diderot as my major example of  the biologization of  individuality, 
although this could also be compared to certain moments in early- to mid-twentieth 
century ‘biophilosophy’, where thinkers such as Kurt Goldstein and Georges 
Canguilhem articulated an ‘organismic’ theory of  personhood, where the biological 
facts and the personal facts support one another.42 (This does not mean I am treating 
Diderot as a ‘precursor’ of  some form of  intellectual complexity generated in the 
mid- to late twentieth century, whether out of  biology, physics, literary theory or other 
areas. Examples of  such addiction to the ‘virus of  the precursor’ abound; at one time, 
Diderot was a precursor of  Whitehead.43 Rather, I seek to understand such cases in 
their argumentative context in order to additionally reflect on how and what they can 
contribute to a materialist theory of  the self.) 
For Diderot, materialism definitely implies a degree of  reduction – a 
deflationary or destructive impulse to trace back “our most sublime feelings and our 
purest tenderness” to “a bit of  testicle.”44 But this is not a reduction of  the human or 
animal action or personhood to the action and necessitation of  falling stones or 
clockwork. It is a reduction to the animal, so to speak – as when he writes, 
commenting critically on the Dutch scholar Franz Hemsterhuis’ 1772 Lettre sur 
l’homme, “wherever I read soul I replace it with man or animal.”45 It retains an embodied 
focus, so that, e.g. properties of  the soul are explained in terms of  properties of  the 
body,46 not of  fundamental physics. In the language of  theory reduction, we could say 
that for Diderot, the reducing theory is biology, not physics (there was no physics to 
speak of, and more importantly, he felt that the cluster of  theories later to be termed 
biology, and then referred to as ‘natural history’ in general, was the richest). In 
Diderot’s major fictional piece of  speculative natural philosophy, the Rêve de 
D’Alembert, the character D’Alembert challenges the character Diderot to account for 
the self. Diderot has more or less successfully defended the concept of  a living, 
sensing and thinking matter, but D’Alembert queries: “Could you tell me about the 
existence of  a sentient being in relation to itself?”, that is, about the self-awareness of  
a sentient being. Diderot speaks in Lockean terms of  memory as the basis for our self, 
and adds the materialist tenet that memory itself  is the product of  our physiology 
(organisation). Later on, in another dialogue of  the Rêve, the ‘pupil’ character Mlle de 
Lespinasse tells the doctor, Bordeu, that some things seem so obvious to her in a pre-
philosophical way that no philosophy, especially materialism, could change her mind: 
particularly “that of  my unity, my self, for instance. Blast, it seems to me that there is 
no need of  such verbiage to know that I am me, I have always been me, and I will 
never be any other.”47 
What is the materialist reply? That the self  is itself  the result of  a 
construction of  smaller elements – parcels of  living matter (literally, “molécules 
sensibles”). An organism is formed by adjunction of  living points or animalcules, by 
purely material processes: “A hundred, a thousand times, I have seen the shift from 
inert matter to active sensitivity, to the soul, to thought, to reasoning – without any 
other agent or intermediary than material agents or intermediaries.”48 This shift from 
inert matter to active sensitivity – and the “soul” (here used, as was increasingly 
common in the period e.g. in authors such as Charles Bonnet, to mean ‘mind’) is 
associated with the biological theory of  epigenesis, according to which the embryo 
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grows by successive additions of  material layers rather than according to a ‘preformed’ 
set of  immaterial information. Epigenesis is understood here as rebutting dualism and 
its biological cousin, preformationism, which Diderot presents sarcastically via the 
character of  the doctor Bordeu: “I wager, Mademoiselle, that you believed that having 
been . . . a very tiny woman in your mother’s testicles, you thought you had always 
been a woman in your present form.”49 In this shift from inert matter to sensing, 
living matter, how do I feel that I am myself ? For Diderot, the answer is: in and 
through my central nervous system – which, as we saw above with regard to the 
Epicuro-Lucretian theme of  the infallibility of  sensation – is both myself and a 
guarantor of  my relation to the rest of  the material world in a constant process of  
exchange. 
Yet it is not obvious that the shift in matter theory from a more passive to a 
more active matter, which is explicit in Diderot (building on earlier authors such as 
John Toland), offers any special basis for a theory of  self. Indeed, one problem for 
such ‘vital’ or ‘vitalized’ materialism is that it begins to resemble panpsychism: if  I am 
made of  small parcels of  living matter, each of  which has a kind of  self, and the ‘self ’ 
of  the whole is simply more powerful than any of  them, what prevents, not only the 
infinitely small bodies, but also the universe itself, from having a self ? The solution 
has to do with the distinction between continuity and contiguity, as I mentioned 
above. This distinction is specifically meant to pick out the difference between mere 
assemblages or ‘heaps’ of  matter, and forms of  organismic unity. Diderot is one of  
the first materialists to explicitly take note of  the ‘fact’ that organisms are in part 
defined by their sense of  unity (the sense, in Kant’s phrase, that I am myself  from my 
fingertips to my head).50 He will also use the language of  unified causality to describe 
this unity: “without regard for the sum of  elements of  which I am composed, I am 
one, and a cause only has one effect; I have always been one single cause [une cause 
une], thus I have never had more than one effect to produce; my duration is thus 
nothing more than a succession of  necessary effects.” In that sense, I cannot “do 
otherwise than myself ” or “be anything other than myself.”51 
Diderot’s articulation of  an embodied materialism – not one understood as 
synonymous with ‘physicalism’52 – can have access to some of  the key features of  
selfhood, individuality and identity which anti-materialists from More and Cudworth 
to Thomas Reid and Edmund Husserl insisted could not be present in a materialist 
analysis.53 Commentators often overlook Diderot’s critique of  Helvétius’ De L’Homme 
(1773), which precisely focuses on the latter’s excessively ‘mechanistic’ picture of  
behaviour as subject to standardized rules of  social conditioning. But contrary to 
Madame Necker (and earlier, Bishop Bramhall, Cudworth, Samuel Clarke) or Thomas 
Reid, who was perhaps the originator of  the distinction between acting according to 
reason and acting according to causes, a distinction that materialists such as Collins 
and Diderot do away with, as they reject appeals to a ‘power of  self-determination’,54 
Diderot does not disagree with Helvétius’ ‘social determinism’ (or crude 
psychophysics of  operant conditioning)55 in the name of  an unconditioned, uncaused 
or otherwise ‘extra-territorial’ self. He finds Helvétius’ program to be not only 
dangerous but condemned to fail, at the very least because of  the irreducible ‘organic’ 
or ‘psycho-physiological’ specificities of  each individual. But within that organic 
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individuality, there is no homuncular self  – as he says in the Eléments de physiologie, 
when I am hungry it is my stomach that is hungry, not ‘me’, and so on. 
In that sense, the judgment, found in a study of  Diderot, that “Materialism as 
a working philosophy, used as a tool in the scientific investigation of  the material 
universe, is appropriate and highly effective. Intended for the objective analysis and 
description of  the world of  externals, it yields disastrous results when applied to the 
inner, subjective world of  human nature, human thought, and human emotions,”56  is 
at best the wielding of  a very blunt explanatory instrument, and at worst, a projection 
of  a personal valuative decision onto seventeenth- and eighteenth-century texts. Both 
La Mettrie and Diderot, and most of  their critics in the eighteenth century, would 
have been surprised to hear that materialism was an effective tool for science and for 
handling ‘the world of  externals’, but not for the inner life. Which does not mean, of  
course, that a materialist account of  the inner life had to be to every one’s tastes! At 
the risk of  juxtaposing statements from two very different discursive registers, 
consider the recognition of  the presence of  embodiment present in judgments such 
as this, from the Nouvelles ecclésiastiques, an important Jansenist publication, in 1758: 
speaking of  Helvétius’ work De l’Esprit, the reviewer declared that it should really have 
been entitled “On Diversely Organized Matter, and even better, . . . On the Flesh, Particularly 
the Dirtiest, Most Impure Flesh.”57 Dirty flesh is different from the cold, inanimate, 
geometrical world studied by ‘science’ in some accounts. 
 
4. Personal identity and the brain 
If  the biologization of  individuality seems to enable the materialist to do 
justice to some core features of  selfhood (on the condition that she is not of  the strict 
physicalist persuasion, in which case facts about the self  would be declassified from 
any material standing, and relegated to – depending on the particular position – qualia, 
folk psychology, etc.), the same cannot be said, or at least not as easily, of  externalism. 
Thus a ‘qualitative’ argument against externalism (which is however quite compatible 
with biological theories of  individuality) will declare that there is something that it is like 
to be me, a special relation, which cannot be grasped from outside, and a fortiori by the 
scientific, ‘third-person’ perspective. The world of  relations seems to ‘drown’ 
individuality, as in Spinoza’s comment to Jarig Jelles that nothing can be said to unique 
with regards to its essence, but only with regard to its existence.58 This seems to have 
been Montesquieu’s reaction, which I cite not least because of  its vivid turn of  phrase: 
he felt that Spinoza “deprived him of  everything personal,” so he could no longer 
“find that self  in which I was so interested”; “why glory? why shame? . . . in the 
universality of  substance, both the lion and the insect have come and gone 
indistinguishably, both Charlemagne and Chilpéric.”59 Conversely, Diderot’s 
vitalization of  matter seemed to preserve selfhood by veering towards panpsychism – 
although to the objection ‘isn’t vitalized materialism the same as panpsychism, since it 
seems to rely on the posit of  Life all the way down?’, Diderot would answer as he 
does notably to Maupertuis, that it is a mistake to explain the complexity of  organic 
bodies by attributing higher-level features such as instinct or memory, to the 
‘molecule’, i.e. the smallest unit of  living matter. The same response can be found in 
some of  the Montpellier vitalists when they seek to distinguish their analysis of  the 
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interrelation of  organs – a functional relation, we might say – from Stahl’s ‘animist’ 
analysis in which the explanatory principle is always the soul. They insist conversely on 
the specific materiality of  the living systems they study (whether it be a person, a 
heart, or the glandular system). 
But, to take stock while at the same time looking forward, consider the 
general question: if  materialism is granted, should selfhood be located (a) in a set of  
relations, as a structurally defined feature, a ‘ratio of  motion and rest’ in Spinozist 
terms (as in Ethics IIp13s), (b) in an actualized, temporal, finite biological entity – with 
additional individuating features to be specified involving its homeostatic equilibrium, 
its immune system, and so forth, or (c) in a purely processual definition such as 
Locke’s continuity of  consciousness over time? 
Recall that Locke’s celebrated theory of  personal identity was in large part 
intended to avoid having to locate the latter in a merely material substance: “[those] 
who place Thought in a purely material, animal Constitution, void of  an immaterial 
Substance” plainly “conceive personal Identity preserved in something else than 
Identity of  Substance; as animal Identity is preserved in Identity of  Life, and not of  
Substance.”60 In addition to this “identity of  Life,” humans have a form of  reflexive 
self-consciousness, a type of  ‘privileged access’ to ourselves in our ability to remember 
our past – despite problems such as potentially fabricated memories – which we do 
not have in relation to others, including the narratives of  others.61 We are dealing here 
with memory, a type of  privileged access crucial enough for it to be constitutive of  
personal identity itself. Yet Locke doesn’t hold that memory per se is the guarantor of  
personal identity. Granted, our self-consciousness is inherently temporal: “as far as 
this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far 
reaches the Identity of  that Person; it is the same self now it was then.”62 But unlike 
Descartes, Locke dissociates consciousness, identity and thought: “[…] methinks, 
every Drowsy Nod shakes their Doctrine, who teach, That the Soul is always 
thinking.”63 This is what I termed a ‘processual’ definition of  selfhood above: it 
explicitly aims to refute and replace any substantial definition – including, of  course a 
materialist definition. Of  course, Locke is frequently agnostic about tensions between 
immaterialism and materialism, but in the present context, he seems to lean in one 
direction: “the more probable opinion is, that this consciousness is annexed to, and 
the affection of  one individual immaterial Substance.”64 
Is a materialist approach to personal identity instantly invalidated, or at least 
weakened, by Locke’s anti-substantialist theory? Yes, if  it meant understanding what a 
self  or individual is (granted, these are not identical terms! as I clarify below) in strictly 
aggregative terms. To be clear, concepts of  selfhood and of  individuality are often run 
into each other in the texts of  the period, including because the question of  the 
immateriality or materiality of  the mind had a direct impact on which conception of  
personal identity could be defended. Thus, when Diderot is criticizing the ‘Platonic’ 
immaterialism of  Hemsterhuis’ manuscript, Diderot writes, “what you take for the 
soul is the self”; and Locke: “Person, as I take it, is the name for this self: Where-ever a 
Man finds, what he calls himself, there I think another may say is the same Person.”65 
That early modern authors run ‘self ’, ‘person’ and/or ‘mind’ together has been 
observed in one of  the best studies of  the topic. 66 Granted, contemporary 
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philosophers would not at all run the concepts of  self  and mind into one another 
(issues such as consciousness, and thus what it means to be conscious and which 
entities are conscious, arise). But in historical context I would emphasize the 
difference between thinkers like Descartes, Malebranche and later Kant, for whom 
there is a core difference between ‘being aware of  one’s mental state’ (propositional 
attitudes, intentionality, etc.) and sensation, passion, feeling, or appetite – and thinkers 
in an Epicuro-Lucretian vein such as La Mettrie and Diderot, who reject the appeal to 
such a difference as unfounded. A case in point – whether or not we are convinced by 
it – is the character Diderot’s response to the character D’Alembert’s challenge at the 
beginning of  the Rêve de D’Alembert: if  I can convince you that matter sense, he says to 
D’Alembert, I don’t need anything further to overcome challenges concerning the 
nature of  thought. That sentience is a feature of  advanced organisms is taken by 
Diderot as an empirical fact (deriving from experiments such as Haller’s on the 
nervous system); that a ‘Cartesian’ or ‘Kantian’ would deny that empirical facts are 
relevant to a decision on the nature of  the mind is a problem beyond the scope of  this 
paper. But the work of  historians of  philosophy (such as Thiel, in this case) should 
make it more difficult for naïve historiographic projections based on such 
philosophical commitments, such as Hill’s judgment on Diderot cited above, to be 
tenable, or convincing.67 
But Locke’s important insights we have just surveyed, are not fatal to a more 
organismic (and thus also relational) concept of  self. Recall Diderot’s distinction 
between merely spatial and mechanical contiguity, and properly organic, indeed 
organismic, continuity:68 the latter concept includes an existential, processual, 
temporal dimension, in the sense that an organism is not just a ‘snapshot’ of  an 
organism. To cite Olson again, “For any organism x and any y, x = y if  and only if  x’s 
life is y’s life.”69 And the sophisticated materialist theorist of  personal identity, not least 
if  she is inspired by biomedical reflection, should not be unaware of  the simple fact 
that the cells in our bodies change over time (an example which Locke thought was 
fatal to a naïve substantialist-materialist theory of  personal identity). As Diderot 
himself  reflects, “through all the vicissitudes I experience in the course of  my 
duration, given that I may not possess a single one of  the molecules I was composed 
of  at birth, how did I remain myself  to others and to myself?”70 Here the Spinozist 
point that what it is to me is not so much a fixed set of  material parts, but rather a 
ratio, is applicable. We could also, again, think of  the case of  our immune system, 
which is neither reducible to a ‘thing’ located at one fixed point in time and space, nor 
a cosa mentale which the biologically nourished materialist can say nothing about. 
 Yet the structural answer (which corresponds in more detail to what I have 
called ‘externalism’ here in section 2) does not exhaust the materialist treatment of  
personal identity. In fact, Locke’s emphasis on memory can be integrated therein, 
despite the seeming paradox (since it was intended to reject the material substantiality 
of  the self). This integration is notably possible because of  the shift in our 
understanding of  memory as itself  a cerebral function. That is, Locke rejects material 
criteria for personal identity and asserts the criterion of  memory; but we would say 
today that the mechanisms of  memory are cerebral functions! Indeed, Diderot 
himself  described memory as a “corporeal quality,”71 but also appeals to it in very 
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Lockean ways, for instance when he criticizes Hemsterhuis’ version of  a traditional 
immaterialist concept of  personhood, stressing that without the memory attached to a 
series of  actions, the individual, moving from sleep to wakefulness and back again, 
would barely be able to take note of  her own existence. At the same time, this 
apparently ‘processual’ rather than ‘substantial’ concept is also integrated in his 
conception of  what I called above ‘the organic self ’ (section 3), as when he asserts 
(via the character Mlle de Lespinasse) that “the history of  the life and the self  of  each 
animal is composed of  the memory of  its successive impressions.”72 The structural 
here has become the corporeal, and/or the cerebral.73 (At times Diderot emphasizes  
the centrality of  the brain – “the key features of  man are in his brain, not his external 
organisation”74 – but at other times he considers it to be a ‘secondary organ’.) 
 
5. Conclusion 
The materialist theory of  self  needs not be blind to or dismissive of  all 
features of  interiority. It can, notably, integrate degrees of  embodied selfhood, qua 
biological individuality. And, if  one thinks of  such features of  our embodiment as 
proprioception (what was often called in earlier contexts ‘the inner sense’), the 
materialist can certain describe certain “routes of  epistemological access”75 between 
ourselves and our bodies. Thereby, instead of  denying the existence of  introspection, 
the materialist should try and locate it within the physical world, within the overall 
framework of  explanation (as Spinoza did).  But since this materialism is not strictly a 
physicalism but can appeal to biological information, it offers plenty of  ways to 
understand individuality, selfhood or agency – as we can see for instance in recent 
work on the ‘immunological self ’.76 And it need not oppose a private (and 
foundational) self  to the body or the brain, as in the phenomenological credo that “It 
is man who thinks, not the brain.”77 The point is not that the materialist theory of  self, 
for instance in Diderot’s articulation of  it, encompasses all the positive features of  all 
other theories of  self  without any of  their negative features; but that classic 
oppositions between a world of  agency, value, intentional states and privacy, and a 
‘merely spatial’ and/or mechanical and by extension somehow dehumanized world, 
needs a serious revision. 
The theory as I have reconstructed it is essentially comprised of  a ‘relational’, 
externalist metaphysics and a biological vision of  individuality, which can be 
combined in different ways, or extended separately – as in the metaphysics of  the 
radical Benedictine monk Dom Deschamps, who authored a then-unpublished treatise 
of  Spinozist metaphysics in the 1760s, La Vérité ou le Vrai Système. This was a 
deliberately Spinozist causal, relational, modal metaphysics of  matter and its 
modifications forming part of  what Deschamps called ‘the Whole’ as distinct from 
the more contingent ‘the whole’. Deschamps mocked the materialists of  his day for 
their belief  that one could give up on metaphysics in favor, e.g. of  an idea of  ‘laws of  
nature’ derived from scientific experimentation, a notion which in his view precisely 
required a metaphysical grounding.78 Conversely, other materialists of  the early 
eighteenth century such as Anthony Collins could restrict themselves to a more 
Lockean starting-point, without either a biologization of  individuality or a causal 
metaphysics of  Nature. It is indeed important that Locke’s discussion of  personal 
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identity plays a role in the articulations of  the theories discussed here (in some 
versions) – although sometimes with unexpected results, as when Diderot himself  
asserts that memory is the ground of  selfhood but then traces it back to other 
physiological analyses in his text and ‘reminds’ the reader that memory is a cerebral 
function. 
In any of  these combinations, we should also note a deflationary or 
reductionist dimension. For however much the materialist theory of  self  retains, it 
also, in a deflationary mode, leads to a rejection or destruction of  selfhood qua interiority, 
certainly as something foundational (the early modern materialist could very well have 
said “You are not authoritative about what is happening in you, but only about what 
seems to be happening in you”).79 The same holds for the apparently real existence of  
individuals as something to be challenged in a deflationary vein, notably nourished by 
Spinozist arguments and extended by authors such as Diderot and Buffon: the latter 
wrote, “an individual of  any sort, is nothing in the Universe; a hundred, a thousand 
individuals are still nothing: species are the only real entities in Nature.”80 
The advantage of  the biological perspective is that it preserves a certain 
realism; the power but also the danger of  externalism as an ontology of  relations, and 
of  the reduction of  personal identity, is that they lose trace of  any existence of  the 
self  (as was often reproached to Spinoza: the ‘selfhood’ of  one finite mode among 
others does not seem like the most appealing defense of  the self). But this advantage 
– unless one has a kind of  transcendental criterion with which to automatically reject 
any confusion between the self  and the ‘feeling of  organic unity’81 – brings with it the 
danger of  ‘biologism’, and of  a metaphysics of  the organism.82 Hence the materialist 
theory of  the self  is a mobile (and modular) set of  concepts, with its advantages and 
its disadvantages, its diversity and its limitations. Future histories or philosophical 
survols of  the self  might consider it worthy of  inclusion.83 
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